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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001245

SIPDIS

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TAGS: EWWT ECON ETRD KHLS IMO PREL PTER PK
SUBJECT: U.S. COAST GUARD RECOMMENDS GOP INCREASE
INDIVIDUAL SHIP SECURITY

REF: 09 STATE 004309

Classified By: Gerald M. Feierstein for reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. A U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) International Port Security Program delegation visited Islamabad, Karachi and Port Qasim April 19-23. They evaluated Pakistan's compliance with the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code of the International Maritime Organization and discussed enhanced security measures in Pakistan ports. After meeting with officials from the federal Ministry of Ports and Shipping, and conducting site visits at the Port of Karachi and Port Qasim, the USCG recommended that Pakistan require that individual ships entering Pakistani ports improve their security posture. The USCG has not yet issued its written report, but delegation members stated that they would likely request that the USG impose conditions of entry on vessels entering the U.S. from Pakistan if increased security measures were not implemented. While port officials were initially defensive about the USCG evaluation, Joint Secretary Zaidi of Ports and Shipping ultimately responded positively and said that additional measures were "possible." End summary.

Background

¶2. (C) In January 2009, EconCouns informed the GOP Ministry of Ports and Shipping that the USG questioned whether Pakistan port security adequately addressed the terror threat level against Pakistan and U.S. interests. Based on this determination, the USG requested Pakistan to implement and maintain heightened (ISPS Level 2) security measures in all Pakistani port facilities. The USG also offered to send a USCG delegation to assess the situation on the ground.

¶3. (C) Three levels of security exist in the ISPS Code: Level 1 (normal), Level 2 (heightened) and Level 3 (exceptional). Each country defines its levels of security depending on its particular circumstances, and what is considered "normal" in one country may be "heightened" in another country. After seeing the security measures at the Port of Karachi and Port Qasim and getting a detailed read out of their procedures, the USCG softened its original position that the ports in Pakistan must always maintain Level 2 security. Level 2 security, according to Pakistani protocol, would effectively stop commerce in the ports as it requires a draw down to skeleton staffing.

Ministry Meetings

14. (C) The USCG delegation met in Islamabad with GOP Ministry of Ports and Shipping S.M. Hassan Zaidi, and briefed him about the USCG International Port Security Program and different types of training programs, exchanges, and other assistance that might be available. The delegation then visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and obtained formal permission to tour the Port of Karachi and Port Qasim.

Port of Karachi

15. (C) In Karachi, the delegation met with Vice Admiral M. Asad Qureshi, Director General of Ports and Shipping; Captain M. Rashid Anwer, Director of ISPS for the Ministry of Ports and Shipping, and a large group of security officers from the Karachi International Container Terminal (KICT), the Pakistan International Container Terminal (PICT), and the Port Qasim Authority. The security officers described their organizational structures and facilities and provided an overview of their compliance with ISPS requirements.

16. (C) The delegation also visited the Karachi Port Operation Tower, which gave the best overall view of the facilities. The delegation noted that the land traffic through the port facility was heavy with trucks and

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pedestrians, but also that the port entrance appeared to have a full security check, including armed guards and heavy metal swinging gates to bar unauthorized entry. The electronic security cards issued by the Port biometrically tie to the national identity cards issued by the GOP.

17. (C) The water side of the Karachi Port was fully patrolled by boats operated by the Navy, Coast Guard, the Maritime Security Agency, and Customs. The Karachi Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO) explained the various checkpoints that each vessel must pass to enter the harbor, and the delegation viewed the computer tracking systems in place in the Port Tower. The USCG delegation noted that a public harbor abutted the main entry and that several small fishing boats were crossing through the area where ships enter. The PFSO noted that even small fishing boats are required to register and carry electronic Vessel Monitoring System devices.

18. (C) The delegation also drove through the KICT and PICT facilities. They noted that some of the perimeter security appeared to be close to overhanging trees, but otherwise saw a heavy security presence on foot and in vehicles.

19. (C) Entry into the Port from the land side was strictly controlled and included a large number of armed foot patrols and identification checks. However, the USCG expressed some concern about the security of ships on the water side. The USCG estimated that the Port's security was in the "Level 1 plus" range, and opined that the ships themselves needed to elevate their security posture to enter the Port. The USCG expressed the opinion that ships might not have sufficient guards or lighting on board in a Level 1 environment to prevent an incursion from the water side of the ship.

Port Qasim

110. (C) Port Qasim is located in a more remote area and its land side security was much tighter than was possible in urban Karachi. In Port Qasim, no outside transporters are allowed to enter and the Port itself arranges for container

drop and delivery, minimizing the number of people at the facility. The delegation met with the Port Qasim Authority PFSO and other security officers, along representatives from Progas Pakistan, DP World, and Fauji Oil Terminal, companies operating from different berths in Port Qasim.

¶11. (C) Port Qasim officials noted that they were in the process of obtaining four new patrol boats, and Progas was acquiring an additional boat. The PFSO of Fauji Oil Terminal emphasized that their terminal contained only a single point of entry with armed guards, and that they had acquired two new patrol boats, biometric identification controls, car search devices, metal detectors, and a comprehensive closed circuit television security system.

¶12. (C) The USCG noted that Port Qasim also was operating at a "Level 1 plus," and expressed some concern that the security on ships would not match that of the Port. The USCG recommended that the GOP require ships to raise their security level to match the level of port security upon entry to the Port.

Conclusions

¶13. (C) The USCG gave the Ministry of Ports and Shipping very high marks for their comprehensive training programs and exercises and such initiatives as Port Qasim's centralized bomb disposal unit. The USCG also noted that most of the company and Ministry officials were retired military who likely had significant experience in security matters.

¶14. (C) Comment: The USCG indicated that Pakistan's port security was sufficient, but stated that the GOP should require ships to raise their security level on entry into ports. The USCG will likely ask the GOP to draw up a

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Declaration of Security for each ship entering a port, which would include measures such as extra guards and enhanced exterior lighting, with the cost to be borne by the ships. The USCG stated that, because ports already have a heightened level of security, ships entering the port without extra security measures add vulnerability that needs to be addressed. By implementing extra measures, ships can raise their security level to match the level of port security and better prevent security breaches. On entry into the U.S., each ship's Declaration of Security would be reviewed to ensure that the ship had actually fulfilled its conditions while in Pakistan. The USCG did not mention any particular timetable. The alternative would be far more costly and detrimental to Pakistani commerce, and would include the U.S. issuing a Port Security Advisory for Pakistan, imposing conditions of entry into the U.S. for any ship that lists Pakistan as one of its last five ports of call.

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